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A Sour Carrot and a Big Stick: Reviving Antitrust
Enforcement After Stolt-Nielsen1
Iris Tilley2
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court’s October 2006 decision to, for the second time,
deny certiorari of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals antitrust case StoltNielsen, S.A., et. al., v. United States3 went largely unnoticed by most
American consumers. All the major legal newspapers mentioned the
incident, but outside of law firms, it sparked little water cooler discussion.
It did not make the morning news, and a Dateline exposé is not likely to
result. Despite this lukewarm response, the Court’s decision was big news
for businesses and consumers across America.
In Stolt-Nielsen, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals established that
parties who enter into immunity agreements under the Department of
Justice’s (DOJ) Corporate Lenience Policy (CLP) are not entitled to a
preindictment review if the DOJ alleges that the party has breached the
terms of its immunity agreement.4 That is, if the DOJ believes that a party
has breached the terms of its immunity agreement, the DOJ can file charges
against the corporation or individual without first judicially establishing that
the corporation or individual is actually in breach.5 This means that
regardless of the terms of a party’s immunity agreement and the
incriminating information the party has already provided pursuant to the
agreement’s protection, in the Third Judicial Circuit—which includes
Delaware (where over 50 percent of the United States’ publicly-traded
companies are incorporated)—the DOJ can unilaterally abrogate the terms
of the immunity agreement and indict a party previously protected by the
agreement’s terms.6
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The importance of the Third Circuit’s holding and the Supreme Court’s
subsequent decision to deny certiorari of the appeal stems from two distinct
and equally important factors. The first factor is the devastating impact
anticompetitive behavior can have on both consumers and businesses, and
the second factor is the inherent difficulty involved in discovering and
prosecuting antitrust violators.
Anticompetitive behavior robs U.S. consumers of hundreds of millions of
dollars annually.7 One way that companies accomplish this appropriation is
by forming cartels with their competitors.8 Within these cartels, the
member companies often agree to fix prices, rig bids, or allocate customers
among the members.9 As a result, the companies within each cartel do not
have to compete with one another, so they can increase prices to artificially
high levels. Consequently, quality and innovation often fall to the
wayside.10 This leaves law-abiding companies at a distinct disadvantage
within the market because they are not privy to the manipulated market
conditions enjoyed by cartel members. Ultimately, consumers pick up the
bill through inflated market prices.11
Antitrust laws are problematic to enforce because cartel activity is
secretive and, as a result, is difficult to detect and prove.12 As exemplified
by the CLP, the DOJ has historically attempted to mitigate this difficulty by
combining a carrot and a stick approach.13 While the sweetness of the
carrot and the size of the stick have varied over time, the structure of the
CLP has always been to provide some form of immunity to parties that
come forward to disclose their own antitrust violations (the carrot), and
some form of fines and criminal penalties for those parties that fail to
disclose their activities at all or fail to disclose them in a timely manner (the
stick).14 The DOJ’s initial version of the CLP was not very effective, but in
1993, the department revamped the program by bolstering the immunity it
offered self-reporting violators.15
Since the CLP was revamped,
applications for immunity under the program have increased from one per
year to two per month, and the DOJ has collected millions of dollars in fines
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from the resulting prosecutions.16 However, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals’ ruling in Stolt-Nielsen and the Supreme Court’s denial of
certiorari threaten to undermine the success of the CLP because they
eliminate much of the incentive for a company to self-report
anticompetitive behavior.17
The precedent left in Stolt-Nielsen’s wake undermines the purpose of the
CLP because it is likely to discourage antitrust violators from self-reporting
antitrust violations, and consumers and businesses are likely to suffer the
consequences. Consequently, Congress should mitigate the impact of StoltNielsen though an amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act)
designed to reincentivize companies to self-report antitrust violations.
However, unless and until such legislation is codified, the DOJ should, on
its own initiative, preserve the CLP’s effectiveness by seeking
preindictment review of alleged breaches of immunity agreements.
Part I of this comment provides a brief overview of antitrust law and
addresses the history of immunity, including discussions of statutory
immunity, informal immunity, corporate cooperation agreements, and the
interpretation of informal immunity agreements. Part II explains and
analyzes the details of the Third Circuit’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen and the
precedent left in its wake. Lastly, Part III proposes a draft amendment to
the Sherman Act designed to resurrect corporate immunity, discusses the
reasoning and justification behind the amendment, and, recognizing the
difficulties inherent in enacting a legislative solution, proposes steps the
DOJ should take now to preserve the CLP’s effectiveness.

I. ANTITRUST AND IMMUNITY
As a framework for the forthcoming discussion on the impact StoltNielsen is likely to have on antitrust violators, this section provides an
overview of federal antitrust laws; a summary of the function and types of
immunity, including corporate cooperation agreements; and a discussion of
how immunity agreements are generally interpreted by the courts.
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A. Federal Antitrust Law
While most states maintain their own state-specific antitrust laws, there
are three major federal antitrust laws: the Sherman Act, the Clayton
Antitrust Act (Clayton Act), and the Federal Trade Commission Act.18
Most pertinent for this comment, the Sherman Act is the oldest of the
federal antitrust laws and prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations.”19 The Sherman Act
provides for criminal punishment of some antitrust violations as felonies.20
Only the DOJ is empowered to bring criminal prosecutions under the
Sherman Act.21 In contrast, the Clayton Act is a civil statute targeted at
preventing mergers and acquisitions that are likely to lessen competition.22
In 1936, section 2 of the Clayton Act was amended through the addition of
the Robinson-Patman Act.23 The Robinson-Patman Act targets price
discrimination by explicitly prohibiting any person engaged in commerce
from discriminating in price between competing purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality where the effect may be to substantially lessen
competition in any line of commerce.24 Finally, the Federal Trade
Commission Act prohibits some of the same behavior as the Sherman Act
but carries no criminal penalties.25 Significantly, the Federal Trade
Commission Act is the enabling act for creation of the Federal Trade
Commission, and through it, the Federal Trade Commission is vested with
the authority to police violations of the Act.26
As touched upon in the introduction, while anticompetitive activities are
clearly illegal, they are secretive in nature, so they can be exceedingly
difficult to identify and prosecute.27 As a result, the DOJ has historically
relied on consumers and businesses to report anticompetitive activity.28 On
the business side, it sought to further this goal through the use of corporate
cooperation agreements through which companies that had participated in
anticompetitive activity could receive some form of immunity from
prosecution for cooperating with the DOJ.29 In 1978, the DOJ launched its
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first version of the CLP.30 This initial version of the CLP saw little success.
Until it was amended in 1993, on average, only one company came forward
each year to report a violation.31
In August 1993, the DOJ addressed the deficiencies of the initial CLP by
revising it to provide added protections for participating corporations.32
Specifically, the program was revamped to offer (1) immunity from
prosecution for companies not yet under investigation that reported
anticompetitive activity; (2) immunity options for corporations already
under investigation that reported violations; and (3) protection for officers,
directors, and employees who cooperated with investigations.33
First, companies coming forward to report anticompetitive activity that
were not already under investigation by the DOJ could receive automatic
immunity if (1) upon discovering the unlawful activity, the company took
prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the activity; (2) the
company provided full, continuing, and complete cooperation to the DOJ
throughout the investigation; (3) the confession was a corporate act, not an
isolated confession of an individual executive or official; (4) the company
made restitution to injured parties, when possible; (5) the company was not
the leader or originator of the activity; and (6) the company did not coerce
any other parties to join the illegal activity.34
Second, companies already under investigation by the DOJ that came
forward to report anticompetitive activity could receive immunity if they
met seven distinct conditions: (1) the company must have been the first
member of the cartel to come forward and qualify for leniency; (2) the DOJ
must not already have evidence against the company likely to result in a
substantial conviction; (3) the company, upon discovery of the illegal
activity, must have taken prompt and effective action to terminate its part in
the activity; (4) the company must have reported the illegal activity with
candor and offered continuing and complete cooperation that advanced the
DOJ’s investigation; (5) the confession of illegal activity must have been a
corporate act rather than isolated confessions of individual executives or
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officials; (6) the company must have made restitution to injured parties if
possible; and (7) considering the circumstances, the DOJ must determine
that granting leniency would not be unfair to others.35 Under the CLP,
“leniency” is defined as freedom from prosecution.36
Third, officers, directors, and employees could receive immunity for
cooperating with investigators. This change expanded the CLP by allowing
for immunity in two separate ways.37 If a corporation qualified for
immunity under the first prong of the CLP, all of its officers, directors, and
employees who admitted their involvement as part of the corporate
confession would receive automatic immunity.38 Alternatively, if a
corporation did not qualify for immunity under the first prong of the CLP,
all of its officers, directors, and employees who initially came forward with
the corporation would be considered for immunity under the same standards
as if they had approached the DOJ individually.39 (Please see Appendix A
for the full text of the revised CLP.)
The DOJ and antitrust commentators have hailed the revised CLP as a
decided success.40 The DOJ has even gone so far as to call the CLP its
“single greatest investigative tool,”41 and others have called it the DOJ’s
Antitrust Division’s “primary weapon” in criminal antitrust prosecution.42
The DOJ has specifically credited the CLP with greatly increasing corporate
sanctions.43 The CLP has been so successful that it has motivated other
countries to adopt nearly identical programs throughout the world.44 Those
countries include Canada, the European Union (EU), Australia, Brazil,
Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, and Estonia.45 Of particular note is the
corporate leniency program established by the European Commission.46
Inspired by the success of the DOJ’s CLP in the United States, the
European Commission launched its own corporate leniency program in
1996.47 The program led to a significant increase in the number of cartels
that the EU uncovered and punished, and in 2001, the EU’s total annual
fines even surpassed the highest annual fines ever imposed by the United
States.48
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Following the DOJ’s revisions to the CLP, it strengthened the stick of
antitrust fines and criminal penalties in two distinct ways. First, in 1994, it
succeeded in getting the International Antitrust Enforcement Act passed by
Congress.49 The Act allows the United States to enter into agreements with
foreign antitrust agencies to exchange investigative information.50 After the
Act, the DOJ could increase the reach of its enforcement arm by using the
information obtained by other countries to prosecute anticompetitive
behavior in the United States and encourage other countries to prosecute
international violators by sharing its investigative materials.51 Thus, a
company facing prosecution in the United States for antitrust crimes could
face prosecution in multiple other countries.
Second, in 2004, Congress passed the Antitrust Criminal Penalty
Enhancement and Reform Act (ACPER) of 2004.52 Under the ACPER,
fines under the Sherman Act were increased to $100,000,000 for
corporations and $1,000,000 for individuals, and prison sentences were
increased to ten years.53
B. Immunity
While corporate cooperation agreements, like those fostered under the
CLP and similar international programs, are clearly the most relevant form
of immunity from an antitrust prospective, an overview of immunity in
general is necessary to clearly understand the importance of immunity as a
tool for criminal prosecutors.54
Immunity is, in the most fundamental sense, a tool to assist prosecutors
with obtaining the information necessary to prosecute crimes.55
Specifically, it offers prosecutors a way to obtain information that a witness
is not inclined to provide without violating the witness’s Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.56 Immunity takes two main forms:
statutory and informal immunity.
Statutory immunity comes into play when a witness refuses, on the basis
of his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, to testify
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or provide other information in a proceeding “before or ancillary to—(1) a
court or a grand jury of the United States, (2) an agency of the United
States, or (3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two
Houses, or a committee or subcommittee of either House.”57 Statutory
immunity allows the person presiding over the proceeding to compel the
witness to testify through a court order.58 Witnesses compelled to testify
pursuant to statutory immunity must testify; however, with limited
exceptions, prosecutors are prohibited from using any information thus
compelled in a subsequent criminal prosecution of that witness.59 The idea
is that immunity displaces the witness’s fear of prosecution, thus
eliminating the need for Fifth Amendment protections.60 While not of
significant relevance to this comment, state law also often provides for
statutory immunity for cases heard in state court.61
Statutory immunity is well-defined. The Supreme Court has held that a
witness compelled to testify must receive at least use plus derivative use
immunity.62 Use plus derivative use immunity, first adopted in 1972 by the
Court in Kastiger v. United States,63 prohibits prosecutors from using
compelled testimony directly against the witness in the trial at hand or in
future trials.64 Before the Court adopted the standard of use plus derivative
use immunity, the Court enforced the use of transactional immunity, a much
broader form of immunity.65 Unlike use plus derivative use immunity,
transactional immunity protects witnesses from ever facing prosecution
based on issues arising from the immunized testimony.66
Today,
prosecutors may grant transactional immunity, but they are only required to
grant use plus derivative use immunity.67
Unlike statutory immunity, which arises because a witness is compelled
to testify, informal immunity is the result of a contractual agreement
between the government and a witness.68 As a result, informal immunity
differs from statutory immunity in a number of significant respects. First,
from a procedural prospective, informal immunity does not require a court
order.69 Second, because informal immunity is based on contract law, the
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parties are free to bargain for and agree to any form of immunity.70 The
parties must simply agree to the terms of the particular agreement.71 As a
result, informal immunity may ultimately offer a witness more or less
protection than statutory immunity.72 Despite this uncertainty, the validity
of informal immunity agreements has frequently been upheld.73 Third,
because informal immunity agreements are based on contracts, they can be
voided for material breach.74 Consequently, a witness testifying under an
informal immunity agreement can choose to breach the agreement at any
time by asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege on the witness stand.75 A
witness who elects to assert this privilege, however, will lose the benefits
bargained for in his or her informal immunity agreement.76 Furthermore, a
prosecutor is only permitted to ask questions within the scope of the
immunity agreement.77
C. Interpreting Informal Immunity Agreements
In areas like antitrust law, where the underlying activity is difficult to
identify without proactive measures on the part of the violators, informal
immunity agreements such as the conditional leniency agreement entered
into by Stolt-Nielsen play a significant role in prosecution. However, with
their significant role often comes difficult interpretation problems.
Informal immunity agreements are contractual in nature and, as such, are
interpreted according to general principals of contract law.78 In the simplest
terms, if the disclosing party performs his or her end of the bargain, the
government is bound to perform its promise and the terms of the immunity
agreement will be enforced.79 However, if the disclosing party materially
breaches his or her commitments under the immunity agreement, the
government can be released from its reciprocal obligations.80 This analysis
is slightly complicated by due process concerns, which require the
government to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, both that the
defendant breached the agreement and that the breach was significantly
material to warrant recision.81 Additionally, any ambiguity must be
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resolved in favor of the witness.82 The idea behind this concept is that the
witness gave up his or her constitutional right to remain silent by providing
the government with incriminating evidence, therefore the government
should not be able to abrogate the witness’s immunity agreement without
significant reason.83
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reinforced the importance of
immunity agreements in United States v. Castaneda84 when it reversed the
defendant’s conviction because the government had improperly revoked the
defendant’s immunity agreement.85 However, in addition to reinforcing the
importance of immunity agreements, Castaneda highlighted the difficulty
inherent in determining whether or not a defendant has actually breached an
immunity agreement.86 In Castaneda, the defendant was convicted of
involvement in a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO) conspiracy.87 From 1990 to 1994, the defendant, who owned an
auto repair shop and towing service, conspired with a county attorney to
solicit bribes from individuals accused of driving while intoxicated in
exchange for getting their charges dismissed or their sentences reduced.88
When the Federal Bureau of Investigation began to investigate the
County Attorney’s Office, it sought Castaneda’s cooperation.89
Accordingly, Castaneda entered into a written immunity agreement and a
verbal transactional immunity agreement with the government.90 The
verbal transactional immunity agreement provided that Castaneda was
required to “tell everything that he knew” about the county attorney’s
criminal activity.91
In reliance on these immunity agreements, Castaneda acknowledged his
role in the criminal activity and identified a number of additional
individuals who either had knowledge of the scheme or had been involved
in the scheme.92 Nearly a year after Castaneda acknowledged his role in the
scheme, the government advised him that “because he had ‘failed to provide
. . . relevant and material information concerning criminal activities of
which he was well aware,’ he had violated the transactional immunity
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agreement, so the government was revoking its promise not to prosecute.”93
The following day, a grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against
Castaneda.94 Castaneda was convicted, but the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed his conviction, holding that the government breached its
immunity agreement by prosecuting Castaneda.95
Noting that no clear Fifth Circuit law addressed what constituted
“material breach” of a non-prosecution agreement, the court applied the
definition used in general contract law.96 Under this interpretation, a breach
is not material unless the non-breaching party is deprived of the benefit of
the bargain.97 The court noted that “[t]he less the non-breaching party is
deprived of the expected benefits, the less material the breach.”98 As a
further clarification of the concept, the Castaneda court noted that other
courts within the circuit had clarified the concept of material breach by
comparing it to the concept of substantial performance.99 Under this
approach, if a party’s “nonperformance . . . is innocent, does not thwart the
purpose of the bargain, and is wholly dwarfed by the party’s performance,
the breaching party has substantially performed under the contract, and the
non-breaching party is not entitled to recision.”100 The court noted that this
approach was just as applicable to determining the materiality of breach of
non-prosecution agreements.101 No other circuits have explicitly disagreed.
In Castaneda, the court reasoned that the defendant’s relatively
insignificant omissions “pale[d]” in comparison to the information he had
provided.102 Specifically, the court noted that Castaneda had provided the
court with substantial detailed accounts of bribery involving the other
defendant and seven other individuals.103 The court reasoned that in light of
these significant disclosures, Castaneda’s omission regarding his own
involvement in two of the dismissed charges did not constitute material
breach.104 The court noted that “[i]n the absence of proof of substantial or
intentional omissions by Castaneda constituting prejudice to the
government, the district court erred in permitting the government to revoke
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the non-prosecution agreement with Castaneda and prosecute him in this
case.”105
In contrast, other Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions have declared
that a defendant’s breach was sufficient to warrant recision when the
defendant’s conduct had a substantial impact on collection of relevant
information. For example, in United States v. Ballis, the court allowed
recision of the defendant’s plea agreement because he had withheld
information, offered untruthful testimony, and induced the plea agreement
through fraud.106 In Hentz v. Harget, the court held that the defendant’s
statement to the prosecutor that he intended to change his testimony was
enough to amount to anticipatory repudiation, which justified a revocation
of the agreement.107 A witness’s failure to cooperate by refusing to meet
with governmental representatives and testify before a grand jury has also
been interpreted as sufficient to constitute material breach.108 Additionally,
in United States v. Donahey, the court held that a defendant who provided
evasive, misleading, and unverifiable answers had breached the terms of his
immunity agreement.109
In United States v. Crawford, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted a test partly defined in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
holding that the factors important for determining whether a breach is
material are:
(1) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the
benefit which he reasonably expected; (2) the likelihood that the
party failing to perform will cure his failure; and (3) the extent to
which the behavior of the party failing to perform comports with
the standards of due process and fair dealing.110
In addition to those factors applied by the Crawford court, the Restatement
also considers the extent to which the injured party can be adequately
compensated for the part of the benefit of which he was deprived and the
extent to which the party failing to perform or offering to perform will
suffer forfeiture.111 Where discovery of particular information is not a
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condition precedent to the immunity agreement, the government cannot
repudiate the agreement for failure to get that information from a particular
witness.112
The Sixth Circuit has adopted a more rigorous standard, holding that the
government must prove “bad faith, intention, and [a] substantial omission”
on the part of the defendant before it can be released from its obligation.113
Much like the Fifth Circuit, the Third Circuit has adopted the concept of
substantial performance.114
While courts have generally construed informal immunity agreements by
using the interpretative concepts of contract law, the issue of whether
preindictment review of an alleged breach of an immunity agreement—the
issue in Stolt-Nielsen—has rarely arisen.115 Prior to Stolt-Nielsen, this issue
had only arisen in two cases: United States v. Verrusio116 and United States
v. Meyer.117 In Verrusio, a Seventh Circuit case, the court recognized that
when the government suspects breach of a plea agreement, the best
procedure for the government to take might be to begin with a motion to
release it from its obligations under the agreement, but it held that
preindictment review of whether a defendant breached a plea agreement is
only required if exigent circumstances exist.118 Similiarly, in Meyers, the
court failed to establish a strict rule. Rather, in dicta, the Meyers court
stated that “the preferred procedure, absent exigent circumstances, would be
for the government to seek relief from its obligations under the immunity
agreement prior to indictment.”119

II. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF STOLT-NIELSEN
The story of Stolt-Nielsen, S.A., and its subsidiary, Stolt-Nielsen
Transportation Group Ltd. (collectively “Stolt-Nielsen”), a leading supplier
of parcel tanker shipping services, began in March 2002 when StoltNielsen’s general counsel, Paul O’Brian, resigned.120 In a complaint filed in
the Connecticut Superior Court in November 2002 and in a subsequent
article in the Wall Street Journal, O’Brian claimed that he resigned after he
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told his superiors about collusive trading practices between Stolt-Nielsen
and two of its competitors, and the company failed to take responsive
action.121 After O’Brian filed the complaint, Stolt-Nielsen hired John
Nannes, a former deputy assistant attorney general with the Antitrust
Division at the DOJ, to conduct an internal investigation to determine
whether Stolt-Nielsen had violated any antitrust laws and to advise it
regarding any criminal liability.122 As part of his investigation, Nannes met
with the chairman of Stolt-Nielsen’s tanker division, Samuel Cooperman.123
At the meeting, Cooperman told Nannes that O’Brian had raised some
antitrust concerns and, in response to those concerns, the company had
revised its antitrust compliance policy and distributed the new policy to
employees and competitors.124 Additionally, Cooperman told Nannes that
he thought an internal investigation would demonstrate that the company
was in violation of federal antitrust laws, and he asked Nannes about the
possibility of leniency from the DOJ.125
Following this conversation and with Cooperman’s permission, Nannes
spoke with an officer in the DOJ’s Antitrust Division to inquire about StoltNielsen’s immunity options if the company admitted violations.126 The
officer informed Nannes that based on the DOJ’s prior suspicions that StoltNielsen had been colluding with its competitors, the DOJ had already begun
to investigate its behavior.127 Consequently, Stolt-Nielsen was limited to
immunity under the second prong of the CLP, which offers immunity
options for corporations reporting violations already under investigation.128
Stolt-Nielsen’s ensuing investigation revealed that between 1998 and
2001, one of the company’s executives exchanged customer lists with two
of its competitors.129 The purported purpose of this exchange was to
apportion customers among the companies and restrain competition.130 The
lists proved that Stolt-Nielsen had indeed engaged in anticompetitive
behavior, and the company promptly turned them over to the DOJ. 131
On January 15, 2003, the DOJ entered into a conditional leniency
agreement with Stolt-Neilson under the CLP.132 Pursuant to this agreement,
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the DOJ agreed “not to bring any criminal prosecution against [StoltNielsen] for any act or offense it might have committed prior to the date of
[the agreement] in connection with the anticompetitive activity being
reported.”133 The agreement also provided that the DOJ would not
prosecute officers and directors of Stolt-Nielsen who “admit[ted] their
knowledge of, or participation in, and fully and truthfully cooperate[d] with
the Antitrust Division in its investigation of the anticompetitive activity
being reported.”134 The DOJ’s promise was, of course, conditioned upon
Stolt-Nielsen’s strict compliance with the terms of the Conditional Leniency
Agreement.135 Specifically, the DOJ could revoke the agreement if, at any
time, it determined that Stolt-Nielsen had violated the leniancy agreement’s
terms.136 Additionally, the agreement noted that in the event of breach by
Stolt-Nielsen, the DOJ could use any evidence provided by Stolt-Nielsen
against it in any ensuing prosecution.137 That is, if Stolt-Nielsen breached
the agreement, it could not rely on any form of transactional immunity for
protection.138
The cooperation agreement specifically required that Stolt-Nielsen:
produce all documents and records requested by the DOJ; (2) remain
available for interviews with the DOJ; (3) provide full and truthful
responses to all inquires by the DOJ “without falsely implicating any person
or intentionally withholding any information”;139 (4) voluntarily provide
any information or materials not requested by the DOJ that were
nonetheless relevant to the investigation; and (5) testify under oath when
asked by the DOJ.140 Based on the information provided by Stolt-Nielsen
and its executives, the government was able to secure guilty pleas from
Stolt-Nielsen’s co-conspirators, resulting in prison sentences for individual
executives at those companies and fines totaling $62 million.141
Things did not conclude as quickly for Stolt-Nielsen. The government’s
investigation revealed that Stolt-Nielsen had continued to participate in
anticompetitive behavior for several months after O’Brian initially raised
concerns to Cooperman.142 Despite the fact that Stolt-Nielsen had ceased
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all anticompetitive activity before the agreement was signed (the terms of
the agreement provided for immunity for any violations that took place
before the agreement was signed), the DOJ reasoned that Stolt-Nielsen had
breached the terms of its agreement because, after discovering
anticompetitive activity, Stolt-Nielsen had not taken “prompt and effective
action to terminate its part in the anticompetitive activity.”143 As a result,
on April 8, 2003, the DOJ informed Stolt-Nielsen that it was suspending the
company’s obligations under the agreement and considering withdrawal of
its grant of conditional leniency.144
On March 2, 2004, the Government withdrew its grant of conditional
leniency to Stolt-Nielsen and announced that it intended to indict the
company and one of its executives for violations of the Sherman Act.145 In
response, Stolt-Nielsen sued the DOJ for enforcement of the immunity
agreement and sought an injunction against indictment.146 The district court
responded by granting Stolt-Nielsen’s injunction and holding that, in order
to protect due process rights, it was essential to decide prior to the
indictment whether Stolt-Nielsen had breached its immunity agreement.147
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
separation of powers precluded the court from interfering with the executive
branch’s “‘absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.’”148
The court recognized that an exception exists to the constitutional bar from
enjoining an indictment: when a criminal prosecution would violate
constitutional rights and the violation would result in a chilling effect on the
constitutional rights of others, or where the “mere threat of prosecution
would inhibit the exercise of constitutional freedoms,”149 an injunction is
appropriate. Pointing out that no federal court had ruled that preindictment
review is constitutionally required, the court held that, absent a chilling
effect on constitutional rights, the mere existence of an immunity agreement
did not provide it with the authority to enjoin the filing of an indictment.150
The court concluded that postconviction review is sufficient.151
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Stolt-Nielsen appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Court
initially denied certiorari on August 21, 2006,152 but this decision drew such
a strong response (six amicus curiae briefs were filed153) that the court
agreed to distribute the case for conference on October 27, 2006.154 On
October 30, 2006, the Court again denied certiorari, letting the Third
Circuit’s holding stand.155
A. A Strange Result
Since its 1993 revision, the CLP has been successful, at least in part,
because it attacks the very trust that must underlie a successful cartel.156 In
doing so, it creates a “prisoner’s dilemma” for cartel members.157 Each
cartel member is aware of the substantial benefits available to the first
company to come forward under the CLP and disclose the cartel’s
anticompetitive activities, and each is aware of the substantial risks
associated with not coming forward at all.158 Cartel members are thus left
constantly wondering when one of the other members will leave the cartel
and expose the remaining cartel members to significant liability.159
Consequently, cartel members find themselves in a race of sorts to reach the
DOJ first and receive immunity.160 This phenomenon has resulted in
increases in both the total number of cartels reported and the total value of
fines collected under the new CLP.161 In addition, the DOJ has credited the
revised CLP with preventing cartels from forming in the first place by
dissuading would-be members with a significant risk of exposure.162
Under the revised CLP, the risks associated with cartel involvement are
so substantial that expected profits after seeking CLP leniency are actually
greater than those associated with staying in a cartel.163 Consequently,
under the CLP, it makes more economic sense to cease antitrust activity
than to remain part of a cartel.164 However, Stolt-Nielsen has changed the
equation for would-be self-reporters by significantly increasing the risks
associated with self-reporting. That is, after Stolt-Nielsen, companies
comparing the benefits of cartel activity with those of self-disclosure must
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consider a new risk: despite having formed an immunity agreement with the
DOJ, without the benefit of a preindictment judicial review of the
agreement, the secured immunity will not necessarily preclude indictment
and prosecution for an alleged breach of the agreement. Suddenly, the
rewards for self-disclosure appear far less substantial.
1. The Deterrence Effect
By increasing the risk associated with disclosing anticompetitive
behavior under the CLP, the DOJ and the Third Circuit have, in essence,
removed one of the primary incentives the CLP offers companies
participating in anticompetitive behavior: the incentive of safety from
indictment and prosecution.165 Elimination of this safety component is of
paramount concern to companies for three main reasons.
First, cartel activity has many benefits for its members. Depending on
the type of activity associated with a cartel, it can artificially raise prices
leading to higher profits for member companies; it can eliminate
competition and, consequently, the need for member companies to innovate
(thereby saving research and development costs); and, through customer
allocation, it can help member companies establish a strong customer
base.166 While these results are not good for consumers or non-colluding
businesses, they are good for the companies involved in cartels and provide
a significant incentive to remain part of a cartel.167 Before Stolt-Nielsen, the
safety of reporting anticompetitive activity under the CLP served as a
significant deterrent for many would-be and existing cartel members
because they feared that they would be reported by those former cartel
members seeking immunity.168 However, the carrot has changed from safe,
reliable immunity from prosecution to immunity from conviction (CLP
participants now can seek only postindictment review of their immunity
agreements). As a result, the economic benefits of reporting cartel activity
have decreased significantly because, as further discussed below,
indictment and prosecution can come at a significant cost to a company’s
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reputation.169 With the carrot now sour and the stick now mightier,
increased cartel activity may result.
Second, the impact an indictment can have on a corporation bolsters the
concern that the court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen will likely lead to an
increase in cartel activity. Contrary to the court’s reasoning in StoltNielsen, indictment is more than a “painful obligation of citizenship” for a
corporation or executive.170 Indictment can, quite literally, prove fatal to a
corporation—regardless of whether the corporation is actually ever
convicted of any wrongdoing.171 As noted in the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce’s amicus brief in support of Stolt-Nielsen’s petition for
certiorari:
[i]t is hardly news that the indictment of a corporation, coupled
with adverse publicity, potential loss of various licenses and rights,
disaffection of suppliers, customers, and financing institutions that
might otherwise arrange loans, and possible suspension from
government contracts, can be catastrophic, no matter how the
criminal process ultimately concludes.172
One amicus curiae illustrated this argument by reference to the fall of
Arthur Andersen LLP.173 Once a major accounting firm, Andersen was
indicted in 2002 in connection with the Enron scandal.174 Andersen was
eventually cleared of all charges, but the damage had already been done,
and the company was left largely in shambles.175 The amice further
illustrated this point by referencing the story of the law firm Milberg
Weiss.176 Once one of the nation’s wealthiest and most powerful law firms,
Milberg Weiss had two partners indicted on fraud charges in May 2006.177
According to the charges, Milberg Weiss had been paying some of its class
action plaintiffs to sue.178 The charges against Milberg Weiss’ partners
have yet to be settled, but the indictment’s impact on the firm was swift.179
Following the indictment, a number of clients left Milberg Weiss, and the
firm still struggles to survive.180 Similar to Arthur Andersen, Milberg
Weiss suffered the damage of potential criminal involvement at indictment,
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not conviction.181 Consequently, the court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen is
likely to dissuade companies from entering into immunity agreements with
the DOJ because they will fear the possibility of criminal indictment (and
the financial harm that will result) if the DOJ suspects that they breached
the terms of their agreement.
Finally, when a company comes forward to report anticompetitive
activity and forms an immunity agreement under the CLP, the company is
required to fully participate with the DOJ’s investigation.182 In addition to
information related to the other cartel members, this cooperation involves a
complete confession of the immunized company’s involvement in
anticompetitive activities.183 As a result, any company indicted after
participating in a CLP immunity agreement is in a far worse position than a
newly discovered defendant because a CLP defendant will have already
provided the government with all the information necessary to secure an
indictment.184 Consequently, would-be self-reporters are likely to be
dissuaded by the unavailability of preindictment judicial review after StoltNielsen.
2. Harm to Customers and Businesses
Anticompetitive activity is harmful to consumers and businesses alike.185
Cartel activity in particular can lead to an increase in the prices consumers
pay for a good or service by more than 10 percent.186 In addition, because
participating companies do not need to compete with one another, their
incentives to invest in innovation are greatly decreased, leaving consumers
with less choice within the market.187 Cartel activity also hurts reputable
businesses by putting them at a disadvantage in the marketplace because it
forces them to compete with the significantly inflated market power
enjoyed by a cartel.188 Furthermore, because it is by its very nature secret,
cartel activity is difficult to identify and prosecute.189 Consequently, the
advent of a workable incentive to encourage businesses and individuals to
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come forward and disclose antitrust activity was, in many ways, an ideal
solution.
Following the 1993 amendments to the CLP, some argued that the
revisions would hurt customers by limiting damages for the parties injured
by antitrust violations; however, the results have been entirely inconsistent
with this fear.190 Since the CLP was revamped, criminal antitrust fines have
increased from an average of $29 million per year to well in excess of $100
million per year.191 In addition, commentators argue that the revised CLP
has led to a decrease in cartel activity (although the secret nature of cartel
activity makes it impossible to state numbers with specificity).192 The
revised CLP has thus offered significant benefits to both consumers and
lawful businesses.
However, Stolt-Nielsen has changed the equation for would-be selfreporters by significantly increasing the risks associated with self-reporting.
This increase in risk is likely to discourage violators from disclosing
antitrust activity under the CLP, which in turn could lead to an increase in
cartel activity, thereby harming innocent businesses and consumers.193

III. RESURRECTING THE CLP
Resurrecting the CLP in light of Stolt-Nielsen is not a simple task;
however, its complexity does not arise solely from the terms of the court’s
holding. The complexity is also due to the difficulties inherent in providing
a balanced corporate immunity policy. That is, while corporate immunity—
at least in the antitrust context—has been shown to be advantageous to
consumers, allowing corporate immunity too wide a breadth could lead to
insufficient punishment for culpable parties and inadequate compensation
for injured parties.194 In addition, separation of powers must, of course, be
maintained.195 Therefore, Congress should respond to the problems StoltNielsen created by amending the Sherman Act to encourage self-disclosure
of antitrust violations. Below is proposed legislation I have drafted to serve
this purpose. Following the legislation, I explain how it would resurrect
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antitrust enforcement in Stolt-Nielsen’s wake. While I argue that legislation
offers the best remedy, as an alternative approach, unless and until such
legislation is codified, the DOJ should—on its own initiative—preserve the
CLP’s effectiveness by seeking preindictment review of alleged breaches of
immunity agreements.
A. Proposed Legislation
The Informal Immunity Act
Material Breach shall be defined as a substantial breach of the
agreement. Material breach shall only constitute breach when it
deprives one party of the benefit of the bargain. For example,
failures by the witness to disclose material that would have made a
conviction possible is material breach. In the case of contractual
immunity agreements between the federal or state government and
individuals or corporations:
1.

Once agreed to by both parties, such agreements are
not subject to revocation absent material breach by
one or both of the parties to the agreement.

2.

If one party believes the other party has materially
breached the agreement, such party shall bring the
alleged breach to the other party’s attention and
attempt to resolve the issue amicably.

3.

If an amicable resolution is not possible, the party
alleging breach shall bring the issue before a district
court in the appropriate region for a judicial
determination of breach.

4.

Any indictment under the Sherman Antitrust Act shall
not take place until the district court judge has issued
a ruling on whether or not the non-moving party
materially breached the terms of the agreement.

5.

If the district court holds that the agreement has been
materially breached, the non-breaching party may
take remedial action; however, the information
disclosed pursuant to the immunity agreement must
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remain protected based on use plus derivative use
immunity, and any evidence used in the prosecution
of the previously immunized party must arise from a
demonstrated independent source.
6.

If the district court holds that the agreement has not
been breached, the parties are bound by this decision
and must continue to abide by the terms of the
agreement.

1. The Proposed Legislation Clarifies the Concept of Breach
Of significant concern after Stolt-Nielsen is the possibility that the DOJ
will elect to terminate an immunity agreement formed under the CLP after
the immunized company has provided incriminating information. The
proposed legislation addresses this concern in two ways. First, the
legislation clearly defines breach, and an example is provided to clarify the
otherwise vague language.196 This specifically addresses the concern
because it provides a clear measure by which the immunized company can
gauge its behavior so that it can avoid conduct that constitutes a breach.
This is a particularly important element because, as previously discussed,
courts have not consistently defined the elements of a material breach.
Second, the legislation provides for a secondary form of immunity in the
event of breach. This secondary form of immunity is use plus derivative
use immunity, so that even if a party breaches its immunity agreement, the
prosecutor cannot use the testimony obtained pursuant to the agreement to
convict the corporation or individual. The prosecutor must obtain the
evidence independently.
2. The Proposed Legislation Clarifies the Procedures for Managing
Allegations of Breach
Another component of the additional risks associated with post-StoltNielsen CLP immunity is the risk that the DOJ will unilaterally abrogate the
terms of an immunity agreement, and the defendant will not have the
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chance to defend him or herself. This is a risk because regardless of how
the parties define the terms or whether the company actually breached the
immunity agreement, the law, after Stolt-Nielsen, does not clearly define the
procedures and processes available to a company accused of breaching its
immunity agreement. Thus, a company considering whether or not it
should self-disclose anticompetitive behavior cannot be certain what will
happen if the DOJ believes it has breached its immunity agreement.
The proposed legislation eliminates this risk because it requires the DOJ
to bring the matter before a district court judge before it revokes a
company’s immunity agreement and indicts the company for potential
antitrust violations. By clearly defining the process the DOJ must use to
claim breach and companies’ options for defending such claims, the
proposed legislation would allow companies to again enter into agreements
under the CLP without fear of what will happen if the DOJ has reason to
allege that they have breached their agreements.
3. The Proposed Legislation Provides for Preindictment Determination
of Breach
As previously discussed, regardless of actual guilt, an indictment can lead
to severe, if not fatal consequences for a corporation. Consequently, the
holding in Stolt-Nielsen—that preindictment judicial review is not
required—is likely of significant concern to companies considering coming
forward under the CLP.
The proposed legislation is designed to remedy this issue by granting a
preindictment hearing in which a district court judge would determine
whether the company has actually materially breached the terms of its
agreement. The inclusion of a preindictment hearing is helpful because it
allows for both parties to state their cases in a court of law, but it does so
before the allegedly breaching party has suffered the financial harm of an
indictment.

ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

A Sour Carrot and a Big Stick 415

This proposed legislation also addresses the separation of powers issue
raised by the court in Stolt-Nielsen. The court in Stolt-Nielsen reasoned that
the district court could not enjoin the prosecutor from indicting the
company because to do so would constitute judicial interference into
exclusively executive decisions, such as whom to indict.197 This legislation
eliminates this concern by taking the decision out of the hands of the court.
Despite the fact that this legislation limits the DOJ’s power to bring an
indictment under certain circumstances, new separation of powers issues are
not raised because the president would need to sign any legislation, and,
like the DOJ, the president is part of the executive branch.
4. The Proposed Legislation Furthers the Policy Goals of the CLP
Three main policy goals underlie this proposed legislation. First, it seeks
to buttress the objectives of the CLP by encouraging self-disclosure of
anticompetitive behavior. Second, it seeks to reduce judicial waste by only
allowing for the indictment and trial of those who have actually breached
the terms of an immunity agreement. Third, it seeks to ensure that victims
of corporate crime are properly compensated for their losses.
First, this proposed legislation seeks to enhance the policy goals of the
CLP by encouraging companies to self-disclose antitrust violations. The
stated purposes of the CLP are to increase punishment and deterrence of
anticompetitive behavior.198 This proposed legislation achieves this policy
goal by clearly defining the processes by which a corporate immunity
agreement can be challenged by the government and the defenses available
to an immunized corporation. By clearly defining these goals and ensuring
that corporations have a just opportunity to defend against attempts by the
DOJ to rescind immunity agreements, this legislation could encourage
renewed corporate cooperation in the CLP and, in turn, could lead to
increased punishment and deterrence of anticompetitive behavior.
Second, the proposed legislation seeks to reduce judicial waste by
preventing indictments when immunity agreements have not actually been
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breached. Under Stolt-Nielsen, regardless of the merits of an alleged
breach, the DOJ can indict the allegedly breaching company. Under the
proposed legislation, before indictment occurs, the government would be
required to argue its case in a preindictment hearing, and the company
would have the opportunity to defend its actions. While this defense would
take place in a hearing, the judicial resources required for a short hearing
are much less than those required for a full trial. The proposed legislation,
therefore, would further the policy goal of judicial efficiency.
Finally, the proposed legislation seeks to ensure that the victims of
anticompetitive activity are fully compensated for losses resulting from the
activity. It does this by mitigating the risks Stolt-Nielsen created for selfdisclosing companies, thus encouraging companies to come forward under
the CLP. This would necessarily lead to more discoveries of unlawful
behavior, more restitution for consumers, and a decrease in anticompetitive
activity.
B. DOJ Should Seek Preindictment Review
A legislative solution to this problem would be ideal because it offers a
clear and reliable way to communicate to businesses that the CLP still
offers safe and effective immunity for companies coming forward to selfdisclose anticompetitive activity. However, the realities of the situation
must be recognized. Specifically, the legislation proposed in this comment
would limit executive power by preventing the DOJ from indicting
companies that it believed had breached agreements formed under the CLP
until it had established the breach through a preindictment hearing.
Realistically, the president, as a member of the executive branch, is not
likely to sign legislation that would limit the power of the executive.
Therefore, in order to preserve the CLP’s effectiveness, the DOJ should
develop a policy of affirmatively seeking preindictment review of any
potential breaches of immunity agreements formed under the CLP, and it
should promote this policy through speeches, press releases, and interviews.
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While the DOJ may argue that a policy of conducting preindictment
reviews is unduly burdensome, the benefits of such a policy far outweigh
the costs. The CLP represents one of the DOJ’s most valuable antitrust
investigation tools, but its effectiveness has been undermined by StoltNielsen. The policy would not be unduly burdensome for the DOJ to enact
because, as noted by the Seventh Circuit in Meyers, the DOJ already has to
obtain a judicial determination of a defendant’s breach after indictment but
prior to trial.199 Thus, shifting the time at which this determination occurs is
a “de minimis inconvenience for the DOJ to protect what it has described as
its “single greatest investigative tool.”200
A change in policy, however, is of little use if companies are not aware of
it. Therefore, in conjunction with this policy change, the DOJ should
undertake significant marketing efforts to educate companies about the new
policy and its implications.
Following the DOJ’s 1993 launch of the revamped CLP, the DOJ took
significant steps to ensure that companies were informed of the program’s
amendments. 201 Specifically, it announced its revisions at an American Bar
Association conference and followed up the announcement with several
press releases.202 In the years since 1993, the DOJ has made a concerted
effort to promote the program through speeches and press releases designed
to communicate the program’s success.203 The DOJ’s promotional work
has been supplemented by articles in mainstream media such as Forbes and
the Financial Times, which have broadcast the CLP’s protections to
businesses around the world.204 The record settlements secured under the
CLP have also led to significant press coverage.205 Some companies have
added to the media coverage by issuing their own press releases announcing
their cooperation agreements with the DOJ.206
This coverage has been credited with increasing the number of
companies coming forward under the CLP.207 However, many of the
positive messages communicated by the DOJ and the many news sources
that encouraged companies to come forward under the revised CLP were
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undermined by the significant news coverage of Stolt-Nielsen. Thus, in
order to encourage businesses to again come forward under the revised
CLP, the DOJ should engage in significant marketing efforts to promote its
new policy.
Specifically, the DOJ should announce its policy in a public forum such
as a national conference. In this announcement, the DOJ should
acknowledge the concerns many companies are likely experiencing after
Stolt-Nielsen and assure them that it has instituted a national policy of
refraining from indictment before proving that a company has indeed
breached the terms of its leniency agreement.
Following this
announcement, the DOJ should issue press releases to each of the main
news outlets and post the releases on its own Web site. As a final step in its
promotional plan, the DOJ should encourage its deputy assistant attorney
general for criminal enforcement of the Antitrust Division to seek
interviews with mainstream media like the Wall Street Journal, Forbes, and
The New York Times to publicize the DOJ’s revised policies to businesses
that might not be adept at researching legal developments through other
avenues.
Thus, while a legislative solution would be ideal, unless and until such a
solution is codified, the DOJ should, on its own initiative, modify its
policies to prohibit indictment without first seeking a determination of
breach, and it should aggressively promote the modification in order to
restore the force of the CLP.

IV. CONCLUSION
While the Third Circuit’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen and the Supreme
Court’s subsequent decision to deny review made little impact in the eyes of
most American consumers, the courts’ decisions have the potential to
significantly affect American consumers and lawful businesses. This
impact stems from the two distinct and equally important factors: (1) the
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harm caused by antirust violations, and (2) the difficulty inherent in
discovering and prosecuting antitrust violators.
The Third Circuit’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen exacerbated these factors by
undermining what had been a very successful program for encouraging selfdisclosure of anticompetitive behavior, the DOJ’s CLP. After Stolt-Nielsen,
the CLP is a far riskier proposition than it once was. Companies now are
likely to think carefully before reporting antitrust activity under its terms,
and customers and lawful businesses are likely to suffer the consequences.
However, it is not too late to reinvigorate the CLP and encourage
companies to come forward under its terms. Congress should mitigate the
impact of Stolt-Nielsen though an amendment to the Sherman Act designed
to reincentivize companies to self-report antitrust violations. Should such
legislation not be enacted, the DOJ should—on its own initiative—institute
and promote a policy of seeking preindictment review of alleged breaches
of immunity agreements in order to preserve effectiveness of its own
program, the CLP.
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APPENDIX A
CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY
The Division has a policy of according leniency to corporations reporting
their illegal antitrust activity at an early stage, if they meet certain
conditions. “Leniency” means not charging such a firm criminally for the
activity being reported. (The policy also is known as the corporate amnesty
or corporate immunity policy.)
A. Leniency Before an Investigation Has Begun
Leniency will be granted to a corporation reporting illegal activity before an
investigation has begun, if the following six conditions are met:
1.

At the time the corporation comes forward to report
the illegal activity, the Division has not received
information about the illegal activity being reported
from any other source;

2.

The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal
activity being reported, took prompt and effective
action to terminate its part in the activity;

3.

The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor
and completeness and provides full, continuing and
complete cooperation to the Division throughout the
investigation;

4.

The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act,
as opposed to isolated confessions of individual
executives or officials;

5.

Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to
injured parties; and
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6.

The corporation did not coerce another party to
participate in the illegal activity and clearly was not
the leader in, or originator of, the activity.

B. Alternative Requirements for Leniency
If a corporation comes forward to report illegal antitrust activity and does
not meet all six of the conditions set out in Part A, above, the corporation,
whether it comes forward before or after an investigation has begun, will be
granted leniency if the following seven conditions are met:
1.

The corporation is the first one to come forward and
qualify for leniency with respect to the illegal activity
being reported;

2.

The Division, at the time the corporation comes in,
does not yet have evidence against the company that
is likely to result in a sustainable conviction;

3.

The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal
activity being reported, took prompt and effective
action to terminate its part in the activity;

4.

The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor
and completeness and provides full, continuing and
complete cooperation that advances the Division in its
investigation;

5.

The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act,
as opposed to isolated confessions of individual
executives or officials;

6.

Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to
injured parties; and

7.

The Division determines that granting leniency would
not be unfair to others, considering the nature of the
illegal activity, the confessing corporation’s role in it,
and when the corporation comes forward.
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In applying condition 7, the primary considerations will be how early the
corporation comes forward and whether the corporation coerced another
party to participate in the illegal activity or clearly was the leader in, or
originator of, the activity. The burden of satisfying condition 7 will be low
if the corporation comes forward before the Division has begun an
investigation into the illegal activity. That burden will increase the closer
the Division comes to having evidence that is likely to result in a
sustainable conviction.
C. Leniency for Corporate Directors, Officers, and Employees
If a corporation qualifies for leniency under Part A (above), all directors,
officers, and employees of the corporation who admit their involvement in
the illegal antitrust activity as part of the corporate confession will receive
leniency, in the form of not being charged criminally for the illegal activity,
if they admit their wrongdoing with candor and completeness and continue
to assist the Division throughout the investigation.
If a corporation does not qualify for leniency under Part A (above), the
directors, officers, and employees who come forward with the corporation
will be considered for immunity from criminal prosecution on the same
basis as if they had approached the Division individually.
D. Leniency Procedure
If the staff that receives the request for leniency believes the corporation
qualifies for and should be accorded leniency, it should forward a favorable
recommendation to the Office of Operations, setting forth the reasons why
leniency should be granted. Staff should not delay making such a
recommendation until a fact memo recommending prosecution of others is
prepared. The Director of Operations will review the request and forward it
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to the Assistant Attorney General for final decision. If the staff recommends
against leniency, corporate counsel may wish to seek an appointment with
the Director of Operations to make their views known. Counsel are not
entitled to such a meeting as a matter of right, but the opportunity will
generally be afforded.208
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